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I. INTRODUCTION 
For decades before 1996, damages awarded for personal injuries 
were not taxable.1 The Internal Revenue Code had excluded from taxable 
income damages awarded for “personal injuries or sickness.”2 In 1996, 
however, Congress amended § 104(a)(2) so that the exclusion applied 
only to “personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”3 The amendment 
further specified that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical 
injury or physical sickness.”4 
Thus, after decades of settled law, Congress created the need to 
distinguish, for tax purposes, between injuries that are “physical” and 
those that are not—a line that is difficult to draw. Additionally, it declared 
that “emotional distress” is not “physical”—despite scientific research 
establishing the strong connection between emotional and physical 
aspects of human health.5 Further, by giving disfavored tax treatment to 
damages for emotional distress, as distinguished from damages for 
1. “From the beginning of tax time, awards or settlement proceeds for personal injuries have 
been excluded from taxation.” Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51, 59 (2015) (citing Revenue Act of 1918, 
ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919)). 
2. I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018)). 
3. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755,
1838. 
4. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000). 
5. See, e.g., Brian Vastag, Decade of Work Shows Depression Is Physical, 287 JAMA 1787,
1787 (2002). 
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physical injuries, it acted against the trend in tort law, which has long 
accepted that emotional harm is as legitimate as physical harm. This 
division between taxable emotional distress damages and nontaxable 
emotional distress damages—hinging on the definition of “physical 
injuries”—is highlighted in the context of sexual harassment cases. 
Sexual harassment victims are often awarded emotional distress 
damages and thus often pay taxes on their awards, even though claims 
involving unwanted sexual advances and contact seem incontrovertibly 
and inherently physical. At what point is the abuse sufficiently “physical” 
under the Internal Revenue Code that the victim will not be taxed on the 
award? The prevailing interpretation of “physical” requires observable 
bodily harm, such as a cut or a bruise.6 In other words, the damages are 
taxed if sexual harassment causes anxiety and depression, insomnia, 
headaches, and stomach problems. Damages are not taxed, though, if the 
sexual harassment is memorialized with a bruise. 
This Article proposes a conception of the “personal physical injury” 
exclusion that does not require observable bodily harm. The § 104 
exclusion has historically been interpreted by reference to tort principles. 
And tort law has long recognized the legitimacy of emotional distress 
arising from invasions of physical interests that do not cause bodily harm, 
even when it would not recognize emotional distress in other contexts. 
The personal physical injury exclusion should be interpreted to recognize 
the inherently physical nature of some torts, particularly the trespassory 
torts of battery and false imprisonment, which protect against invasions 
of a person’s physical autonomy, security, and liberty. Thus, emotional 
distress suffered as a result of these inherently physical torts is attributable 
to a personal physical injury and should be excluded. 
Part I below provides a brief history of, and the purported rationale 
for, the personal injury exclusion and an overview of the criticisms of the 
1996 amendment. Part II illustrates the current state of the personal 
physical injury exclusion with several hypotheticals, including 
application of the infamous Bruise Ruling. Part III sets out and fully 
explains this Article’s proposal: that the “personal physical injury” 
exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should be interpreted consistently with tort 
principles such that emotional distress damages attributable to intentional 
invasions into a person’s physical autonomy, security, and liberty should 
be excluded from taxable income regardless of whether the tortfeasor 
memorializes the event with a bruise. Part IV shows that the legislative 
history of the amendment indicates that Congress did not set out to change 
6. See infra Part II.C.
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80 years of tax law by taxing emotional distress damages attributable to 
these physical invasions identified in Part III. Part V highlights, in support 
of this Article’s argument, a sex abuse case in which the IRS was willing 
to assume § 104(a)(2) “personal physical injuries.” 
II. BRIEF HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF THE PERSONAL INJURY
EXCLUSION 
An exclusion for damages recovered for personal injuries was first 
codified in 1919.7 Several rationales have been offered in support of the 
long-standing exclusion. The primary justification for excluding from 
taxable income damages awarded for personal injuries is the idea that 
these kinds of recoveries merely restore the plaintiff to the same position 
he would have been in without the personal injury. The plaintiff has 
merely recovered “human capital,” and he has not recognized any gain.8 
The exclusion might, alternatively, be based on compassion for the 
victim,9 or the idea that the government should not benefit from the 
misfortune of its citizens.10 It has also been proposed that the exclusion is 
justified because the taxpayer’s injury—and accession to wealth—is 
involuntary.11 He surely would have rather avoided the physical injury—
and the damages—and it would be unduly harsh to tax him for a recovery 
he would have rather avoided.12 
While, historically, it was generally understood that the personal 
injury exclusion applied to both physical and non-physical injuries,13 the 
exclusion was primarily utilized to exclude damages for physical injuries 
and only a few nonphysical injuries such as defamation and loss of 
7. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919). 
8. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996) (describing the purpose of I.R.C. § 104(a) 
as excluding “those damages that, making up for a loss, seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking 
very loosely, ‘return the victim’s personal or financial capital.’”). This rationale, as all the others, has 
been questioned. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal 
Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 343 (1995); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 
77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 152–53 (1992). 
9. J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal
Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13, 43 (1989). 
10. Kahn, supra note 8, at 349. 
11. Id. at 347–48. 
12. Id. 
13. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 236 n.6 (1992) (“Although the IRS briefly
interpreted § 104(a)(2)’s statutory predecessor, § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1066, 
to restrict the scope of personal injuries to physical injuries, . . . the courts and the IRS long since have 
recognized that § 104(a)(2)’s reference to ‘personal injuries’ encompasses, in accord with common 
judicial parlance and conceptions, nonphysical injuries to the individual, such as those affecting 
emotions, reputation, or character, as well.”).  
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss1/3
2019] TAX FREE DAMAGES 75 
consortium.14 In the 1980s and 90s, courts began interpreting the statute 
much more broadly, though, extending it to more cases that did not relate 
to physical injuries. For example, it was held that damages were excluded 
from taxable income for deprivation of the right to free speech,15 for 
injuries to professional reputation,16 wrongful discharge,17 and violation 
of the ADEA.18 
As a result of the expanded interpretation of the exclusion to 
encompass all manner of damages—an exclusion that was seen to have 
“careened out of control with respect to nonphysical personal 
injuries”19—the IRS sought to modify § 104(a)(2) to limit the exclusion 
to damages for personal physical injuries, rather than just personal 
injuries.20 
A. The 1996 Modification—”Physical” Injury and Sickness 
In 1996, Congress radically changed the personal injury exclusion by 
§ 1605 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 entitled: “Repeal
of Exclusion for Punitive Damages and for Damages Not Attributable to 
Physical Injuries or Sickness.”21 Revised § 104(a)(2), and the current 
version thereof, reads: 
14. Burke & Friel, supra note 9, at 39–41.
15. Bent v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 236, 249 (1986), aff’d, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1988).
16. See Miller v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 330, 335 (1989); Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 81, 82
(6th Cir. 1988). 
17. Byrne v. Comm’r, 883 F.2d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 1989). 
18. Schleier v. Comm’r, 26 F.3d 1119, 1119 (5th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 515 U.S. 323 (1995). 
19. J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal Injury Awards 
Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 167 (1997). It is interesting to note that this 
is not the only context in which the meaning of “personal injury” has been so difficult. There are three 
recognized approaches to interpreting “personal injury” in § 1328(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
which excludes from discharge debts owed due to “personal injury” inflicted by the debtor. A “narrow 
approach requires a physical injury to the individual”; a “middle approach reads “personal injury” to 
include some non-physical injuries such as defamation, sexual harassment, age discrimination, and 
emotional distress, but not business or financial injuries; and a “broad approach includes business and 
financial injuries if they are defined as a personal injury tort under non-bankruptcy law.” In re Bailey, 
555 B.R. 557, 561 (Bankr. N. D. Miss. 2016). 
20. Congress attempted, unsuccessfully, in 1989 to limit the exclusion for “personal injuries
and sickness” to cases involving physical injuries and sickness. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. § 11641 
(1989). While that amendment did not pass, what did pass was an amendment that nonetheless treated 
damages related to nonphysical injuries less favorably than damages related to nonphysical injury, 
but only with respect to punitive damages. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-239, § 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)). Thus, the amendment only 
strengthened the argument that, pre-1996, the “personal injury” exclusion covered both physical and 
nonphysical injuries. See Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax Anxiety, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 77, 87 (2013). 
21. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755,
1838. 
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(a) [G]ross income does not include— 
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received 
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as period 
payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical 
sickness; . . . . 
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as 
a physical injury or physical sickness.”22 
Thus, where pre-1996 the exclusion had been for damages received 
on account of “personal injuries or sickness,” after the 1996 modification, 
the exclusion now applies only to “personal physical injuries or physical 
sickness.” Further, all punitive damages are taxed post-1996, even if 
received on account of physical injuries or physical sickness, with one 
very narrow exception.23 
Significantly, where compensatory damages are received on account 
of “personal physical injuries,” the entire amount is excludable. That is, 
lost wages—if received on account of personal physical injury—are 
excluded even though they are a substitute for otherwise taxable income.24 
And damages for emotional distress—if received on account of personal 
physical injuries—are excluded, despite the statute’s declaration that 
“emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury.”25 
Thus, whether a plaintiff’s damage award is received “on account of 
personal physical injuries,” is a critical point. A determination that 
damages are received “on account of personal physical injuries” is a 
watershed26 determination bestowing tax-free status on all compensatory 
damages flowing therefrom that would otherwise be taxable. What, then, 
is the definition of “personal physical injuries,” as distinct from a 
22. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018). 
23. Punitive damages in a wrongful death action are excluded from taxable income if state law 
provides that only punitive damages may be awarded in a wrongful death action. See H.R. Rep. No. 
104-737, at 301 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793. 
24. The broad principle that damage recoveries ought to be given the tax character of the item 
for which they are intended to substitute breaks down in the context of physical injury recoveries. See 
ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS 2–4 (2012 Supp., 
4th ed. 2009). Wages would have been taxable; thus, application of that general principal would lead 
to the conclusion that damages for lost wages would be taxable.  
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (“Emotional distress is not considered a
physical injury or physical sickness. However, damages for emotional distress attributable to a 
physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from income under section 104(a)(2).”). 
26. Robert W. Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, TAX NOTES, April 21,
2008, at 279 (noting the “watershed” nature of physicality determination stating: “Once one crosses 
the threshold of physicality, all damages flowing from the physical event, including emotional distress 
damages, also become excludable.”). 
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“personal injury,” under § 104(a)(2)? It is rather easy to determine that, 
by adding the word “physical,” Congress wanted to curtail the exclusion. 
But to what degree? The distinction has been the subject of much criticism 
and confusion. The subject of even more criticism and confusion is the 
modification’s treatment of damages awarded for emotional distress since 
the modification declared that “emotional distress” is not a physical injury 
or physical sickness. 
B. Criticisms, Confusion, and Calls for Reform 
The idea that damages awarded for physical injuries are taxed 
differently from damages awarded for emotional distress has been subject 
to much criticism. As many have pointed out, the hypothesized rationales 
for not taxing damages compensating victims for their physical injuries 
also hold true in the context of damages to compensate victims for their 
emotional injuries.27 Additionally, the idea that emotional suffering is not 
“physical” is contrary to modern scientific research that establishes the 
strong connection between emotional and physical aspects of human 
health.28 Treating emotional harm as somehow less real or worthy of 
compensation than physical harm is also counter to the decades long trend 
in tort law.29 
The criticisms have spawned calls for reform that are wide ranging—
some arguing to tax more damage awards and some arguing to tax fewer 
damage awards. One proposal is to make all damages received as a 
substitute for lost income taxable, whether related to emotional or 
physical harm, eliminating the distinction between “physical injuries and 
physical sickness” and “emotional distress.”30 Another proposal is to tax 
nearly all damages, including those received on account of physical 
injuries, and to inform juries of the tax consequences so that appropriate 
27. E.g., Ronald H. Jensen, When are Damages Tax Free?: The Elusive Meaning of :Physical 
Injury, 10 PITT. TAX REV. 87, 130 (2013). 
28. See, e.g., Richard E. Gardner III, Mind Over Matter?: The Historical Search for
Meaningful Parity Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 675 
(2000) (“[A]dvances [in] modern brain science and neuropsychology . . . suggest[] that a distinction 
between the physical and the mental is, in many circumstances, spurious.”). Congress has recognized 
that mental illnesses are physical illnesses, at least in the context of insurance. See Christopher Wright, 
Taxation of Personal Injury Awards, Addressing the Mind/Body Dualism that Plagues 104(a)2) of 
the Tax Code, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 211, 234–35 (2010) (noting that, by passing the Paul Wellstone 
and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) and requiring 
insurance companies to treat mental illness no differently than traditional physical illness, Congress 
indicated its understanding the mental illness is physical illness).  
29. See infra Part III.
30. Jensen, supra note 27, at 134–35. 
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adjustments may be made.31 The National Taxpayer Advocate has 
proposed that damages for emotional distress should be excluded the same 
as damages for physical injuries, pointing out that the issue of taxation of 
damages “spurs litigation every year.”32 
The issue addressed in this Article—the meaning of “personal 
physical injuries”—is only one component of the confusion arising from 
the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.33 It is not always the “personal physical injury” 
phrase of the statute that is problematic for the taxpayer seeking to exclude 
a damage award from taxable income; instead, it is often the “on account 
of” part of the statute that is fatal to the taxpayer.34  The proposal of this 
Article is related specifically to the meaning of “personal physical 
injuries.” 
The 1996 modification addressed in this Article is not new, and 
neither are the criticisms or proposals for reform. Different from previous 
proposals, though, this Article proposes a conception of the “personal 
physical injury” exclusion that, without modification of the statute or 
revision of the regulations, will bring back into the exclusion at least some 
damage awards for emotional distress. By interpreting “personal physical 
injury” to refer to the tort concept of “physical injury,” the exclusion will 
include (and render tax free) damages awarded for emotional distress 
suffered by victims of battery, assault, and false imprisonment, regardless 
of whether the perpetrator memorializes their tort with a bruise or a cut. 
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE PERSONAL PHYSICAL INJURY EXCLUSION
AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
Section 104(a)(2) currently reads as follows: 
31. Holcomb, supra note 20, at 80. 
32. Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2009 Annual Report to Congress 351–57 (2009), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2_09_ tas_arc_vol_1_lr.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CEN-P6TR]; see also 
Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2008 Annual Report to Congress 472 (2008), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas_arc_mli.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VM6-EE7N](“Taxation of 
damage awards spurs litigation every year.”). 
33. See Holcomb, supra note 20, at 97–99 (explaining that, in addition to problems of
interpreting “personal physical injury” and the “on account of” requirement, plaintiffs face other 
problems, in particular problems with allocation of the damage award).  
34. E.g., Hansen v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. 1447, at *6 (2009). (the complaint and the agreement
did not specify that the settlement was on account of the physical injuries); Nield v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summ. Op. 2002-12, at *8 (Aug. 27, 2002) (court did not find credible taxpayer’s evidence that 
damages were awarded “on account of” the physical injuries, as allegations were lacking in the 
complaint and the settlement agreement); Mumy v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-122, at *5 (Aug. 
24, 2005) (“the document, however, does not contain any language which specifically states that the 
amount paid was to settle the harassment claim, the emotional stress claim, or the assault and 
battery.”). 
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(a) [G]ross income does not include— 
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received 
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as period 
payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical 
sickness; . . . . 
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as 
a physical injury or physical sickness.”35 
Although the language of the statute might appear to mean that 
damages awarded for emotional distress are taxable, that is an 
oversimplification. The legislative history and the relevant regulations 
explain that damages awarded for emotional distress may also be excluded 
from income (even though, according to the last sentence in the above 
quoted statutory language, they are not in and of themselves “personal 
physical injuries”) if the emotional distress damages are “attributable to” 
a physical injury or sickness.36 
The legislative history of the Act (the House Report) states: “Because 
all damages received on account of physical injury or physical sickness 
are excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross income 
applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional distress 
that is attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.”37 Treasury 
Regulation 1.104-1, finally updated in 2012 to address the then-sixteen-
year-old amendment, reiterated the position of the House Report that, 
although emotional distress is not a “physical injury or physical sickness,” 
certain damages for emotional distress may be excluded.38 Pursuant to 
Treasury Regulation 1.104-1: “[D]amages for emotional distress 
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from 
income under section 104(a)(2).”39 
A. The Personal Physical Injury Exclusion Illustrated—Two Lawyers 
The following hypotheticals40 illustrate the differing tax treatment 
of, on one hand, emotional distress damages arising from a classic 
personal injury case for which § 104(a)(2) traditionally (before and after 
the 1996 modification) provided an exclusion and, on the other hand, 
emotional distress damages arising from a “personal injury” that were 
35. I.R.C. § 104(a) (2018). 
36. See infra Part VI.B’s discussion of the flawed logic in this language. 
37. H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–93. 
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012). 
39. Id. 
40. These hypotheticals are adapted from Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 182–87.
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once excluded by § 104(a)(2) but are no longer excluded as a result of the 
“physical” qualifier added in 1996. 
Lawyer 1 (negligence resulting in observable bodily harm)—Lawyer 
1 is a successful solo practitioner and is seriously injured in an automobile 
accident. He brings a negligence action against the driver who caused the 
accident. Lawyer 1 is awarded damages for the following: (1) pain and 
suffering; (2) past and future medical expenses; (3) lost income as a result 
of being unable to practice law; (4) emotional distress as a result of being 
unable to practice; and (5) physical ailments, e.g., headaches, vomiting, 
loss of appetite and sleeplessness, resulting from the emotional distress. 
All compensatory damages awarded to Lawyer 1 are excludable under § 
104(a)(2)—both before and after the 1996 modification. 
Specifically focusing on the emotional distress aspect of the award, 
those would be excluded under the post-1996 “personal physical injury” 
exclusion. Even though Congress specifically provided in the statute that 
emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or sickness for 
purposes of § 104(a)(2),41 because the emotional distress is “attributable 
to a physical injury,” it is excludable. The legislative history of the 
statute42 and Treasury Regulation 1.104-143 make clear that, because all 
damages received on account of physical injury or physical sickness are 
excludable, the exclusion applies to any damages received based on a 
claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or 
physical sickness. 
Lawyer 2 (wrongful termination)—Lawyer 2 is wrongfully 
terminated by his employer. He suffers emotional distress and even 
associated physical ailments, such as headaches, vomiting, loss of 
appetite, and sleeplessness. He is under constant care of a physician or 
even hospitalized for a period. He brings a claim against his employer and 
is awarded damages for the following: (1) lost wages; (2) emotional 
distress; and (3) the physical ailments resulting from his emotional 
distress. 
Because Lawyer 2’s claim did not have its origin in a personal 
physical injury, the post-1996 § 104(a)(2) personal physical injury 
41. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018) (“emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or
physical sickness.”). 
42. H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–93 
(“Because all damages received on account of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable 
from gross income, the exclusion from gross income applies to any damages received based on a 
claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.”). 
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (“Emotional distress is not considered a
physical injury or physical sickness. However, damages for emotional distress attributable to a 
physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from income under section 104(a)(2).”). 
10
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exclusion is inapplicable. He will be able to exclude damages awarded to 
compensate for medical expenses incurred, even though they were related 
to emotional distress. However, he will not be entitled to exclude any 
other aspect of the award, even any award for physical symptoms of his 
emotional distress. 
Under the pre-1996 “personal injury” exclusion, Lawyer 2 may have 
been able to successfully argue that the wrongful termination was a 
“personal injury” and thus all damages were excluded.44 However, after 
the 1996 modification, Lawyer 2 clearly has no legitimate argument that 
the wrongful termination was or caused a “personal physical injury” under 
modified § 104(a)(2). 
Lawyer 2 might attempt to argue, somewhat differently, that the 
emotional distress resulting from the wrongful termination is itself a 
personal physical injury. He might argue that there is no medical or 
scientific difference between the mental suffering and physical suffering. 
But Congress has foreclosed that argument by the plain language of the 
statute. As mentioned previously, Congress specifically provided in § 
104(a)(2) that emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or 
sickness for purposes of § 104(a)(2).45 As a result, Lawyer 2, although 
suffering emotional distress and even associated physical ailments such 
as headaches, vomiting, loss of appetite, and sleeplessness, has no basis 
for excluding the award for emotional distress and its related physical 
symptoms. The fact that Lawyer 2 is under constant care of a physician or 
even hospitalized for a period would not change the result (although, as 
noted above, Lawyer 2 may exclude recovery of medical expenses not 
previously deducted). 
There are a multitude of real world cases in which taxpayers suffered 
physically but paid taxes on awards that compensated them for that 
physical suffering because their physical suffering was caused by 
emotional distress, but that emotional distress was not caused by a 
“physical injury.”46 For example, in Lindsey v. C.I.R., the taxpayer 
experienced hypertension and stress-related symptoms, including periodic 
impotency, insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary 
incontinence as a result of a business dispute.47 Those physical problems 
44. See, e.g., Bent v. Comm’r, 835 F.2d 67, 68 (3d Cir. 1987) (demonstrating that, pre-1996, 
personal injuries damages excluded from taxable income under § 104(a)(2) included mental pain and 
suffering, such as that suffered by the schoolteacher after his employment contract was not renewed). 
45. I.R.C. § 104(a) (2018). 
46. Or, at least they did not prove it, or the complaint or settlement agreement did not
adequately connect the emotional distress to a physical injury. 
47. Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 688–89 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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were caused by emotional distress rather than “personal physical injuries 
or physical sickness,” and thus were not excluded under § 104(a)(2).48 
There are several good arguments that the damages compensating 
Lawyer 2 for his emotional distress should not be taxed if damages 
compensating Lawyer 1 for his emotional distress are not taxed. Similarly 
treated taxpayers should be treated similarly. And the emotional distress 
experienced by Lawyer 2 is no less real than that suffered by Lawyer 1. 
For tax purposes, however, Congress has chosen to ignore Lawyer 2’s 
mental suffering with little to no rationale for the differing treatment. 
The purpose for providing the above hypotheticals here is not to 
make that broader argument that all awards for emotional distress should 
be taxed the same. Instead, the purpose of the above two hypotheticals is 
simply to illustrate the different treatment of emotional distress damages 
where the underlying claims are easily labeled “physical”—in the case of 
the car accident—and not physical—in the case of wrongful termination. 
While the question of whether damages for emotional distress arising 
from nonphysical injuries should be taxed if damages arising from 
physical injuries are tax free may be difficult, it is at least easy to 
distinguish between the physical nature of the car wreck claim and the 
nonphysical nature of the wrongful termination claim. 
The disparate tax treatment of emotional distress damages is more 
puzzling where the line between “physical” and “nonphysical” is less 
clear, such as in sexual harassment cases. The difficulty of distinguishing 
between a physical injury and a nonphysical injury can be demonstrated 
by the following additional hypotheticals. 
B. Three Law Clerks 
Consider the following hypotheticals involving three law clerks 
working for, and inappropriately touched by, the same horrible boss:49 
Law Clerk 1 (punch in the nose)—Boss has a particularly bad day 
and punches Law Clerk 1 in the nose. Law Clerk 1 misses several days of 
work, incurs medical bills, endures pain and suffering, and experiences 
emotional distress, which manifests itself physically in the form of nausea 
and insomnia. He brings an action for common law battery and is awarded 
damages to compensate him for all of the above harms, including his 
emotional distress. 
Law Clerk 2 (fondling with a bruise)—Boss also regularly engages 
in a pattern of sexual harassment toward the female law clerks, including 
48. Id. 
49. These hypotheticals are in part adapted from Holcomb, supra note 20, at 78–80. 
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making lewd comments and fondling them against their wills. The 
fondling of Law Clerk 2 results in a slight bruise to Law Clerk 2. Although 
the bruise clears up in a few days, Law Clerk 2 experiences emotional 
distress arising from the incident and her feelings of humiliation, 
degradation, shame, and embarrassment persist. Law Clerk 2 brings an 
action for common law battery and is awarded compensatory damages, 
including damages for emotional distress. 
Law Clerk 3 (fondling with no bruise)—Boss likewise sexually 
harasses Law Clerk 3 in exactly the same way in which he harassed Law 
Clerk 2—making lewd comments and fondling her against her will. 
However, his fondling of Law Clerk 2 does not (for whatever reason) 
result in a bruise or any other observable mark on her body memorializing 
the traumatic event. Law Clerk 3 also experiences emotional distress 
arising from the incident. And her feelings of humiliation, degradation, 
shame, and embarrassment also persist. Law Clerk 3, like Law Clerk 2, 
also brings an action for common law battery and is awarded 
compensatory damages, including damages for emotional distress. 
Each of the three law clerks has a common law claim for battery.50 
Each is awarded damages to compensate him or her for the emotional 
distress resulting from the battery. The § 104(a)(2) personal physical 
injury exclusion will exclude from taxable income the damages awarded 
for the emotional distress of Law Clerk 1 and Law Clerk 2. However, the 
personal injury exclusion will not apply to the damages awarded to Law 
Clerk 3; her award is fully51 taxable. She will be taxed like Lawyer 2 who 
was wrongfully terminated. 
It is difficult to understand why emotional distress resulting from a 
“bruise-free” sexual battery is taxed like emotional distress resulting from 
wrongful termination. Shouldn’t it be taxed like emotional distress 
resulting from other instances of sexual battery (or from a car wreck or a 
punch in the nose)? Sexual battery, car accidents, and punches in the nose 
are all physical—being fired is not. But such is the result of “the Bruise 
Ruling” discussed in the following section. 
50. These plaintiffs will undoubtedly also have many other valid claims. This Article addresses 
only the question of whether the damages awarded on account of the common law tort claims by 
themselves should be excluded from income. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 26, at 279–82 (focusing 
only on whether an wards for false imprisonment should be excluded from taxable income while 
recognizing the wide variety of ancillary claims that might be asserted by a wrongfully incarcerated 
individual, such as claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, The Innocence Protection Act of 2004, and state 
legislation). Of course, allocation of the damage award between and among all claims the taxpayer 
plaintiff asserts is a critical issue. See, e.g., Holcomb, supra note 20, at 99. 
51. With the caveat that, if she is awarded medical expenses, even those related to emotional
distress are excluded to the extent not previously deducted.  
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C. The Bruise Ruling 
In a 2000 Private Letter Ruling, which has come to be referred to as 
“The Bruise Ruling,” the IRS concluded that damages awarded to 
compensate for unwanted physical contact (that is, a battery) without 
“observable bodily harm” does not constitute “personal physical injuries 
or physical sickness” for purposes of § 104(a)(2).52 According to the 
Bruise Ruling, the key test in identifying excludable versus taxable 
damages is whether there is observable bodily harm, such as a bruise.53 
The Letter Ruling was issued in response to a woman who was 
ultimately sexually assaulted by her employer after she had endured less 
extreme incidents of sexual inappropriateness for a period. She ultimately 
quit and filed suit alleging sexual harassment, battery, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The case was settled, but there was no 
express allocation of damages in the settlement agreement. The IRS 
concluded that the damages awarded for unwanted physical contact 
without observable bodily harm were not received on account of personal 
physical injuries or sickness and were therefore taxable. On the other 
hand, damages awarded for pain, suffering, and emotional distress after 
she suffered an observable physical injury were excludable under § 
104(a)(2) because those damages were attributable to physical injuries. 
The Letter Ruling identifies three separate periods and treats each a 
bit differently for tax purposes: 
Period A—The Period Prior to the First Pain Incident: During this 
period, the woman’s employer began a “slow progression of attempts to 
make sexual contact with [the woman]” and also made several “suggestive 
and lewd remarks.” The employer also “physically touched” the woman 
during this period. However, the contacts during this period did not result 
in any “observable bodily harm such as cuts or bruises the woman’s body, 
nor did they cause extreme pain to the woman.” 
52. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *5. A letter ruling is a response from
the IRS to a written request by a taxpayer asking for guidance on how the IRS will treat a particular 
set of facts. It is binding on the IRS with respect to the taxpayer who requested the Private Letter 
Ruling, and may not be used by other taxpayers. However, they are often relied upon because they 
provide an indication of how the IRS might interpret the Code under a given set of facts. See, e.g., 
Byrne v. Comm’r, 84 T.C.M (CCH) 704, 710 n.14 (2002) (“Although private letter rulings are not 
precedent, . . . they do reveal the interpretation put upon the statute by the agency charged with the 
responsibility of administering the revenue laws.”). 
53. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *4. Most cases that purported to address 
the personal physical injury exclusion reach their holdings because, they conclude, the taxpayers 
failed to demonstrate that the damages were awarded “on account of” purported personal physical 
injuries, rather than because the injuries did not meet the definition of “personal physical injuries.” 
See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 34. The bruise ruling, though, does reach that question. 
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Period B—The Period Beginning with the First Pain Incident and 
leading up to the First Physical Injury: Some time after Period A, the 
employer did assault the woman, causing her “extreme pain.” And, after 
the First Pain Incident, the woman began to have headaches and digestive 
problems, although doctors could not find anything physically wrong with 
her. The woman did not assert in her request to the IRS that those 
problems were due to the First Pain Incident or to events prior to the First 
Pain Incident. 
Period C—The Period Beginning with the First Physical Injury: On 
an even later date, the employer assaulted the woman again. This time, 
the employer cut and bit her. The IRS referred to this incident as the “First 
Physical Injury.” The employer later physically and sexually assaulted the 
woman, cutting her in one incident. As result of yet “another series of” 
assaults, the woman suffered skin discoloration, swelling, and extreme 
pain for which she sought medical treatment. 
In determining whether damages awarded to the woman were 
excludable as being on account of “personal physical injuries” under § 
104(a)(2), the Private Letter Ruling (“PLR”) first searched for a definition 
of “personal physical injuries.” The PLR recognized that § 104(a)(2) does 
not define “personal physical injury,” nor does its legislative history. 
Thus, the PLR turned to Black’s Law Dictionary for some semblance of 
a definition. Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “physical injury” was 
“bodily harm or hurt, excluding mental distress, fright, or emotional 
disturbance.”54 Based on that definition, the PLR concluded that “we 
believe that direct unwanted or uninvited physical contacts resulting in 
observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding are 
personal physical injuries under 104(a)(2).” 
Applying that definition to Periods A and C only, the PLR concluded 
as follows: 
Period A: Any damages received for events occurring before the First 
Pain Incident were not “personal physical injuries” under § 104(a)(2). 
During that period, the unwanted physical contact did not result in any 
observable harms to the woman, nor did it cause the woman pain.55 
54. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *4 (quoting physical injury, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). Black’s has revised its definition. See physical injury, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“bodily injury. Physical damage to a person’s body. — 
Also termed personal injury; personal bodily injury; physical injury.”). 
55. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *2–6. A did not argue that any medical 
treatment she received after the First Pain Incident were related to the period prior to the First Pain 
Incident. In short, for that period, there was no observable harm, pain, or medical expenses. 
Presumably, the fact that she did not incur medical expenses was relevant to determining whether 
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Period C: Any damages received for the period beginning with the 
First Physical Injury were “personal physical injuries” under §104(a)(2). 
The woman suffered “physical injuries”—now defined by the Private 
Letter Ruling as “direct unwanted or invited physical contacts resulting in 
observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling and bleeding”—
beginning with the First Physical Injury.56
Period B: As to physical contact that causes pain but no observable 
bodily harm, the PLR seems to leave open the possibility that physical 
pain can constitute physical injury without observable mementos. But the 
PLR made no decision in the instant case. The PLR explained that 
“Because the perception of pain is essentially subjective, it is a factual 
matter. Therefore, pursuant to § 7.01 of Internal Revenue Procedure 2000-
1,57 we cannot rule whether damages properly allocable to the First Pain 
Incident (a physical contact that did not manifest itself in the form of a cut 
bruise, or other similar bodily harm) were received on account of personal 
physical injuries or physical sickness.”58 
Thus, in the IRS’s view,59 where there is an observable injury, all 
damages flowing from that injury, including emotional distress, are 
excludable. Once a plaintiff crosses that threshold, all damages flowing 
from the physical event, including emotional distress damages, are 
excluded. Of course, particularly in the case of sexual harassment, which 
often involves lengthy periods, identifying the “watershed”60 moment 
where the observable bodily harm occurs, marking the point in time at 
which damages are excluded, is a difficult problem of proof and 
allocation.61 
there were any excludable medical expense reimbursement damages for that period, as opposed to the 
medical expenses being an indication that she had suffered some “physical” injury. 
56. Id. at *5. Her punitive damages were, of course, taxable under §104(a)(2). 
57. Section 7.01 of Rev. Proc. 2000-1 provides that the Service does not have discretion to
issue letter rulings if a problem is factual in nature. Rev. Proc. 2000-1 I.R.B. 5 (“Under what 
circumstances does the Service have discretion to issue letter rulings and determination letters? . . . 
Ordinarily not in certain areas because of factual nature of the problem.”).  
58. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *5. 
59. It is true that, in some instances, the tax court is willing to apply a more lenient standard
than the “cutting, bruising, or swelling” standard of the IRS. See Benjamin T. Cory, Note, Amos v. 
Commissioner: The Ambiguous and Ever-Changing Definition of What Constitutes a Personal 
Physical Injury Under Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2), 66 MONT. L. REV. 247, 262 (2005). 
Nevertheless, the meaning of “personal physical injury” needs clarification.  
60. Wood, supra note 26, at 285 (noting the “watershed” nature of physicality determination). 
61. See, e.g., Prasil v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124, 1129 (2003) (holding that a sexual 
harassment award was fully taxable). 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss1/3
2019] TAX FREE DAMAGES 87 
D. Three Law Clerks—Effect Under Bruise Ruling 
Returning to the three hypothetical law clerks and application of the 
bruise ruling to those victims: Under § 104(a)(2), in order for damages for 
emotional distress to be excluded from taxable income, the emotional 
distress must attributed to a “personal physical injury.” And, according to 
the Bruise Ruling, an injury is a “personal physical injury” only if there is 
an observable bodily harm. 
Thus, for tax purposes, the emotional distress of Law Clerk 2—who 
was groped and bruised—is treated just like the emotional distress of 
Lawyer 1, the car accident victim, and Law Clerk 2, the punch in the nose 
victim. That emotional distress is attributable to a “physical injury” and 
thus damages to compensate those plaintiffs for that emotional distress are 
excluded from taxable income. 
In contrast, the emotional distress of Law Clerk 3 (although she 
suffered the same sexual harassment and “groping” as Law Clerk 2) is 
treated as the emotional distress of Lawyer 2 who was wrongfully 
terminated from employment. 
It seems illogical to treat the emotional distress of one of the sexual 
assault victims like the emotional distress of the wrongful termination 
plaintiff simply because her assault was not memorialized with a bruise 
or a cut. It seems inherently more logical to treat the emotional distress of 
both sexual assault victims the same. Both should be treated like the 
emotional distress of the car accident victim and the punch-in-the-nose 
victim. The sexual assault that does not leave a bruise is not inherently 
less “physical” than a groping that does leave a bruise. Any sexual assault, 
groping, or fondling is inherently physical. And one can imagine some 
kind of groping that would be much more physical (and much more 
traumatic) than a groping that does leave a bruise. 
At least one scholar has similarly argued that some things are 
“inherently and incontrovertibly physical, whether or not they leave 
lasting outward scars.”62 Based on that premise, he has argued that 
damages awards for false imprisonment should not be subject to 
taxation.63 Robert Wood writes: “It is hard to imagine a more obvious 
degree of physicality than being physically confined behind bars. Even if 
62. Wood, supra note 26, at 285. 
63. Robert H. Wood, Why False Imprisonment Recoveries Should Not Be Taxable, 123 TAX
NOTES, June 8, 2009, at 1217. The Sixth Circuit in Stadnvk v. Commissioner, however, has held that 
they are not. 367 F. App’x 586, 587–89 (6th Cir. 2010). In Stadnvk, the taxpayer was wrongfully 
accused of writing a bad check and was falsely imprisoned. She was arrested and handcuffed and 
confined to a cell, which seem to have certainly impacted her physically. Nonetheless, the court 
determined that there was no physical injury and thus no §104(a)(2) exclusion.  
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no bruises or broken bones befall the plaintiff while behind bars, it seems 
axiomatically physical to be physically confined.”64 The same is true for 
unwanted and uninvited physical contact with the body.65 
This Article proposes an understanding of § 104(a)(2) “personal 
physical injuries” that is consistent with the idea that some torts are 
inherently physical. The following section attempts to concretize the 
proposition that some torts are inherently physical. Even without a bruise 
to memorialize the occasion, some torts are sufficiently physical to fall 
within the “personal physical injury” exclusion. 
IV. DAMAGES AWARDED FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
AN INVASION INTO PERSONAL AUTONOMY, PHYSICAL SECURITY, OR 
PHYSICAL LIBERTY SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM TAXABLE INCOME 
UNDER § 104(A)(2), EVEN WITHOUT OBSERVABLE BODILY HARM. 
Tort law has long protected against invasions into personal 
autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty.66 Invasions into those 
interests are “physical injuries.” Tort law distinguishes between an injury 
and the harms caused by that injury. For example, a physical injury might 
cause bodily harm and emotional harm. But the harm is a distinct concept 
from the injury. For these physical injuries—invasions into personal 
autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty—the plaintiff is not 
required to show harm.67 It is presumed. Those plaintiffs are not required 
to show bodily harm. And they can recover for emotional harm without 
proving it. Tort law has always acknowledged emotional harm arising 
from these physical invasions. 
In contrast, when a plaintiff alleges emotional harm arising from 
invasion of a nonphysical interest, tort law is much more skeptical of his 
claim. Thus, tort law treats emotional harm somewhat like § 104(a)(2) 
treats emotional distress in that it distinguishes between emotional harm 
arising from a physical injury and emotional harm arising from a 
nonphysical injury. The personal physical injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) 
should, as tort law does, consider the type of injury that is the source of 
emotional harm. But, it should also, as tort law does, treat invasions into 
64. Robert H. Wood, Should False Imprisonment Damages Be Taxable?, 81 N.Y. ST. B.J. 38, 
38 (2009). 
65. Wood, supra note 26, at 285 (stating that sex abuse, sexual assault, and rape surely fit the 
category of things that are inherently and incontrovertibly physical whether or not they leave outward 
scars). 
66. Infra Part III.B.2.; DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (2d ed.). 
67. Infra Part III.B.1. 
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personal autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty as a “physical 
injury.” It should not require observable bodily harm; tort law never has.68 
This Article will hereinafter refer to the invasions of the above three 
interests as “injuries,” as does the Restatement.69 Thus, this Article will 
use the terms “physical injuries,” “emotional injuries,” and “economic 
injuries.” To distinguish between this tort concept of physical injury—an 
invasion into an interest in autonomy, physical security, and physical 
liberty—and the § 104(a)(2) term “physical injury,” this Article will 
designate where references are to “§ 104(a)(2) physical injury.” Without 
such a designation, this Article is referring to the tort concept of “physical 
injury”—an invasion into a person’s interest in autonomy, physical 
security, and physical liberty. 
As demonstrated in Part A below, the meaning of the § 104 personal 
injury exclusion has always drawn on tort principles. Section B explains 
the difference between a tort “injury” and a tort “harm” and the type of 
tort. Section C demonstrates that tort law treats emotional harm differently 
depending on the type of injury causing the emotional harm. Section D 
explains the ultimate proposition: that the “personal physical injury” 
exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should be interpreted consistently with the 
ancient understanding that tort law protects against intentional physical 
injuries to the person regardless of bodily harm. Thus, although damages 
awarded to compensate for emotional harm flowing from emotional or 
economic injuries are not excluded from taxable income under § 
104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from all physical injuries should be 
excluded under § 104(a)(2). 
A. Interpretations of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion have historically drawn 
on tort law  principles. 
The IRS and the Supreme Court have looked to tort law in 
interpreting the Code’s personal injury exclusion. The Supreme Court 
recognized in United States v. Burke70 that the IRS has “linked 
identification of a personal injury for purposes of 104(a)(2) to traditional 
tort principles.”71 United States v. Burke involved a Title VII action in 
68. Infra Part III.C.
69. Infra note 93. 
70. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
71. Id. at 234 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1991)). The Burke Court also quoted the Tax
Court’s explanation in Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305 (1986), aff’d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 
1988), that “[t]he essential element of an exclusion under section 104(a)(2) is that the income involved 
must derive from some sort of tort claim . . . . As a result, common law tort law concepts are helpful 
in deciding whether a taxpayer is being compensated for a ‘personal injury.’” Burke, 504 U.S. at 234. 
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which the complainants alleged that their employer had discriminated 
against them on the basis of sex in determining salaries.72 They sought 
injunctive relief and backpay for all affected female employees.73 The 
female employees argued that the backpay they received should be 
excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2) as “damages received . . . 
on account of personal injuries or sickness.”74 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to address the question of whether Title VII backpay awards 
should be excluded from gross income under that language of § 
104(a)(2).75 
The majority opinion recognized at the outset that neither the text of 
the statute nor its legislative history offers any explanation of the term 
“personal injures.”76 It thus turned to the relevant IRS regulation that 
demonstrated that the IRS had, since at least 1960, “linked identification 
of a personal injury for purposes of 104(a)(2) to traditional tort 
principles.”77 The Court quoted Treasury Regulation 1.104-1(c), which 
read as follows: “The term “damages received (whether by suit or 
agreement)” means an amount received . . . through prosecution of a legal 
suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement 
agreement entered in lieu of such prosecution.”78 Based on the treasury 
regulation, the Court determined that, to decide whether the § 104(a)(2) 
personal injury exclusion applied, one must look to the nature of the claim 
underlying the damages and determine whether the claim seeks redress 
for a tort-like personal injury.79 
The Treasury Regulation the Court relied upon in Burke was 
modified in 2012—many years after the 1996 modification of § 
104(a)(2).80 The 2012 Regulation eliminates the tort-type right test,81 but 
72. Burke, 504 U.S. at 231–32. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 233. 
76. Id. at 234. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1991)). 
79. Id. The next question, then, was how to determine whether a claim is for a “tort-like 
personal injury.” The Court found critical, to identifying a tort claim, whether the claim provides for 
a broad range of remedies, such as “lost wages, medical expenses, and diminished future earning 
capacity” and also “emotional distress and pain and suffering.” Having decided that whether a claim 
is for a tort or tort-like injury depends on whether the claim allows for a broad range of remedies as 
traditionally available for tort claims, the Court examined the basis for the plaintiffs’ back pay claim—
Title VII. Because Title VII did not allow the plaintiffs to recover for such a broad range of remedies, 
such as emotional distress, the Court concluded that the injury the plaintiffs suffered were not 
“personal injuries” under the §104(a)(2) and thus were not excluded. 
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (2012). 
81. See id. 
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the IRS reiterated that the personal injury exclusion—physical or not, but 
particularly if it is physical—is rooted in tort concepts.82 In the IRS’s 
view, the tort-type right test was necessary only to distinguish tort claims 
from contract claims and thus exclude only damages for tort claims.83 
Second, in the IRS’s view, adding the word “physical” to the exclusion 
rendered the distinction between personal injury (tort) claims and contract 
claims is no longer necessary.84 Ostensibly, if a claim is for personal 
physical injury, it is by definition a tort claim and not a contract claim. 
The exclusion should be interpreted consistent with tort principles. 
B. Tort law distinguishes between “injury” and “harm.” 
1. A Tort “Injury” Distinguished from a Tort “Harm”
The Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes between “injury” 
and “harm.” “Injury” refers to “the invasion of any legally protected 
interest of another.”85 “Harm” refers to “the existence of loss or detriment 
in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause.”86 
The term “harm,” unqualified, is very broad. Examples of “harm” 
include an alteration or change in one’s person; an alteration of change in 
physical things; and the detriment resulting to a person from acts or 
conditions that impair his physical, emotional, or aesthetic wellbeing, his 
pecuniary advantage, intangible rights, reputation, or other legally 
recognized interests.87 The Restatements often qualify the term “harm” 
with terms like “bodily harm,” “physical harm,” and “pecuniary harm.”88 
To distinguish between “injury” and “harm,” it may be useful to 
conceive of a (somewhat) chronological chain of events: tortious act, 
injury, harm, then damages. First, the defendant acts (or fails to act) 
tortiously. Second, as a result of the defendant’s tortious act, the plaintiff 
suffers an injury—a violation of his legally protected interest. Third, the 
82. T.D. 9573, 77 Fed. Reg. 3106, 3107 (Jan. 23, 2012). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. The word “injury” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the invasion 
of any legally protected interest of another. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (AM. L. INST., 
1965). 
86. The word “harm” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the existence 
of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause. Id. § 7(2). 
87. Id. § 7, cmt. b. 
88. Id. § 7(2). 
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plaintiff may suffer “harm” as a result of the injury. Lastly, the plaintiff is 
awarded “damages”89 to compensate for his harm. 
As an illustration to distinguish between the four “events,” consider 
the tort of trespass to land. First, the defendant acts tortiously by 
intentionally entering the land of the plaintiff without permission. Second, 
the injury suffered by the plaintiff is the invasion of his interest in 
exclusive possession of the land. What “harm”—actual loss or 
detriment—does the plaintiff suffer? And what “damages” will the 
plaintiff be awarded for his harm? 
Say that the trespass to land involves the defendant riding his bicycle 
into the plaintiff’s lawn and ruining his garden. The plaintiff has suffered 
actual loss or detriment to his property—that is, he has suffered harm. 
Thus, he can recover damages to compensate him for that harm. 
But say that the trespass to land results in no actual loss or 
detriment—not a blade of grass is bent. That plaintiff can nonetheless 
maintain a claim for trespass—even without showing any “harm”—any 
loss or detriment. This is because, for the tort of trespass to land and 
certain other torts, as will be discussed further below, the plaintiff’s harm 
is presumed. The defendant’s tortious act and the plaintiff’s “injury” are 
sufficient for the plaintiff to maintain a claim;90 no proof of harm is 
required.91 
For purposes of this Article, the points to be derived from the above 
illustration regarding trespass to land are as follows: First, an “injury”—
an invasion of a legally protected interest—is distinct from the “harm” 
that might flow from that injury. Second, for some tort “injuries,” tort law 
will presume that “harm” results simply because of the nature of the 
injury. 
2. Three Categories of Tort Injuries
Tort law protects against invasions of at least three board categories 
of legal interests.92 That is, the types of tort injuries can be categorized 
into one of the following three categories—physical injuries, intangible 
89. The word “damages” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote a sum
of money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another. Id. § 12(A). 
90. See id. § 7, cmt. (a). 
91. Id. Such a plaintiff will not be awarded any compensatory damages, as there is no harm for 
which to compensate him. He might, however, be awarded nominal damages and an injunction against 
further trespass. 
92. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3. 
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injuries, and economic injuries.93 The following section considers those 
three types of injuries in support of the penultimate point of this Article 
that the § 104(a)(2) personal physical injury exclusion should be 
interpreted to include damages for emotional distress (emotional harm) 
flowing from these “physical injuries.” 
Physical Injuries—Invasions of Physical Interests 
Tort law protects against invasions to a person’s interest in his or her 
“primary autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty.”94 This 
category protects against physical interference with either the plaintiff’s 
person or property,95 and these interests are afforded the greatest 
protection by the law.96 The trespassory torts—trespass to land, harmful 
battery, offensive battery, assault, and false imprisonment97—protect 
against these type of invasions. The tort of negligence also provides 
redress for physical invasion.98 
Intangible Injuries—Invasions of Emotional and Other Intangible 
Interests 
Although more reluctantly, tort law also protects against invasions to 
a person’s intangible interests such as emotional security, privacy, and 
reputation.99 Claims for violation of the right of privacy, defamation, and 
slander seek redress for this type of invasion;100 these might be called 
dignitary torts.101 Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress also seek redress for these types 
of invasions,102 but courts are even more reluctant to impose liability for 
a violation of the interest in emotional security without a physical 
interference with personal or property (a “physical injury” discussed in 
93. An invasion of an interest is a tort “injury.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) 
(AM. L. INST., 1965). 
94. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3. 
95. Id. 
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 2, intro. note (AM. L. INST., 1965). 
97. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 28. 
98. Id. § 3. 
99. Id. (“When it comes to intangible harm without physical interference or physical harm,
courts are much more reluctant to impose tort liability.”). 
100.  Id. 
 101.  Offensive battery and assault might also be labeled as “dignitary torts” in that they involve 
“legally cognizable invasions of rights that stand independent of both physical and economic harms, 
that is, invasions of human dignity in the sense of human worth” such as when a battery is 
“interference with the plaintiff’s autonomy, her right to prevent unconsented-to touchings.” That 
dignitary tort label should be distinguished from freestanding dignitary torts that involve no physical 
invasion or direct threat of it, such as defamation or invasion of privacy. See id. § 514. 
102.  Id. 
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the preceding paragraph) or violation of a specific right such as the right 
to reputation or the right to privacy.103 
Economic Injuries—Invasions of Economic Interests 
Third, tort law sometimes protects invasions of the interests in 
economic security and opportunity.104 An example would be a defendant 
“negligently block[ing] access to the plaintiff’s retail store, without 
trespassing or harming the property itself,” such that customers cannot 
reach the store.105 Fraud is another example.106 Just as courts are more 
reluctant to protect interest in emotional security absent some physical 
interference with person or property, courts—at least in the realm of tort 
law, as distinguished from contract law—are also reluctant to protect 
invasions of economic interests.107 
3. Harms Arising from Those Tort Injuries
Different types of “harms”—for example, bodily, economic, or 
emotional—might arise from the different types of tort injuries. For 
example, consider that any of the above types of tort injuries can cause 
economic harm. A physical injury like a punch in the nose or trespass to 
land can result in economic harm such as lost wages, medical bills, or 
repair costs.108 An intangible injury such as defamation or fraud can also 
result in economic harm such as lost income. An economic injury such as 
interference with a business relationship can result in economic harm such 
as lost income. The important point here is that economic injury is distinct 
from an economic harm caused by an economic injury (or by an emotional 
injury or a physical injury).109 
Understanding that economic harm is a different concept from 
economic injury should make it easier to understand a critical point for 
this Article—that emotional injury is different from emotional harm. That 
is important, for purposes of this Article, because this Article argues that, 
although damages awarded to compensate for emotional harm flowing 
from emotional or economic injuries are not excluded from taxable under 
103.  Id. 
104.  See id. 
105.  Id. § 605. 
106.  Id. § 606. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. § 605 (“Any kind of tort can cause financial harm. . . . [H]owever, the economic harm 
is not itself the tort.”). 
109. See id. 
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§ 104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from physical injuries should be
excluded under § 104(a)(2).110 
Other terms that need clarification before proceeding further are 
“physical harm” and “bodily harm.” 111 The term “physical harm” in the 
Restatement (Second) denotes the physical impairment of the human 
body, but it also includes physical impairment of land or chattel.112 
“Bodily harm,” is a more specific type of “physical harm.” “Bodily harm” 
is defined by the Restatement (Second) as “any physical impairment of 
the condition of another’s body, or physical pain or illness.”113 
What is “emotional harm?” The Restatement (Second) uses the terms 
“emotional distress” and “emotional disturbance” without defining 
either.114 The Restatement does indicate, though, that emotional 
disturbance is distinct from bodily harm. “The minute disturbance of the 
nerve centers caused by fear, shock, or other emotions does not constitute 
bodily harm.”115 It also recognizes that such emotional disturbances may 
cause bodily harm.116 This Article will hereinafter use the term 
“emotional harm” in a precise way that distinguishes the concept of 
“harm” from “injury,” as explained above, and distinguishes “emotional” 
harm from bodily or pecuniary harm. 
C. Tort law treats emotional harm arising from a physical injury 
differently from emotional harm arising from an emotional or 
economic injury. 
This section explains that tort law treats emotional harm differently 
depending on the type of injury causing the emotional harm. The personal 
 110.  This may read like a reiteration of what the legislative history and regulations already say. 
But, it is different in that the term “physical injury” here is much broader than those interpretations 
of “personal physical injury.” See infra Part IV. 
 111.  The Restatements often qualify the term “harm” with terms like “bodily harm,” “physical 
harm,” and “pecuniary harm.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) (AM. L. INST., 1965). 
112.  Id. § 7 cmts. 
 113.  Id. § 15. The comments to the Restatement explain that there is an impairment “if the 
structure or function of any part of the other’s body is altered to any extent even though the alteration 
causes no other harm.” Section 104(a)(2)’s concept of “physical injury” seems to be more in line with 
the Restatement “bodily harm” than the much broader Restatement term “physical harm.” 
114.  See id. § 46–48 (“emotional distress”); id. § 436, 456 (“emotional disturbance”). 
115.  Id. § 15, cmt. (b). 
116.  I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) also recognizes that emotional harm can cause bodily harm, but it does 
not include within the exclusion bodily harm that result from emotional harm. It has been argued that 
at least some physical manifestations of emotional distress should be treated as physical illness and 
thus excluded. Wood, supra note 26, at 283 (“some physical consequences [of emotional distress] 
must be viewed as serious enough to constitute physical injury or physical sickness [under § 
104(a)(2)].”). 
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physical injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should, as tort law does, consider 
the type of injury that is the source of emotional harm. In addition, it 
should, as tort law does, treat all emotional harm flowing from personal 
injuries the same, regardless of whether bodily harm also results from the 
personal injury. Although damages awarded to compensate for emotional 
harm flowing from emotional or economic injuries are not excluded from 
taxable income under § 104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from all 
physical injuries should be excluded under § 104(a)(2). 
Just as economic harm could flow from any type of injury, emotional 
harm could flow from any type of injury. First, emotional harm might flow 
from physical injury that also produces bodily harm, such as in the case 
of a classic battery or a negligent car accident. Second, emotional harm 
might flow from a physical injury that did not produce any bodily harm. 
Third, emotional harm might flow from an intangible or emotional injury, 
such as in a case for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress or libel. Fourth, emotional harm might also flow from a pecuniary 
injury such as fraud. 
Emotional harms flowing from the third and fourth types of injuries 
are treated less favorably by tort law than emotional harms flowing from 
physical injuries. And it is these less favored emotional harms that are the 
emotional harms for which § 104(a)(2) does not provide an exclusion. It 
is relatively easy to conclude that by adding “physical,” Congress does 
not intend to tolerate an exclusion for damages awarded to compensate 
for emotional harms that might arise from economic injuries or even 
emotional or intangible injuries.117 
The emotional harms resulting from physical injuries, though, should 
be excluded under § 104(a)(2). And it should not matter, with respect to 
intentional torts, 118 whether that personal injury resulted in bodily harm. 
Nor should it matter whether bodily harm is observable. 
It is axiomatic that, when a physical injury, such as a classic harmful 
contact119 battery, causes bodily harm and that bodily harm causes 
emotional harm, the plaintiff can recover for his emotional harm.120 It is 
also well understood that even when a physical injury, such as an 
offensive battery or assault does not cause bodily harm, the plaintiff can 
117.  See supra Part IV. 
 118.  A negligence claim requires proof of actual harm and so, in the context of a negligence 
claim, the arguments presented in this Article are less relevant.  
119.  “Harmful contact battery” is used here to distinguish from an “offensive contact” battery. 
120.  See DOBBS, supra note 66, § 382 (“The first and most common kind of emotional distress 
recovery occurs when emotional distress is merely an item of damages resulting from some other tort 
such as battery.”). 
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recover for his emotional harm.121 Tort law treats an offensive sexual 
groping, offensive spitting, or false imprisonment just as legitimate as a 
claim for a punch in the nose.122 When a defendant has intentionally123 
and tortiously invaded the plaintiff’s right to autonomy, physical security, 
or physical liberty, the plaintiff can recover for all harms resulting from 
the injury, including emotional harm resulting therefrom.124 Courts have 
had no difficulty recognizing emotional harm suffered as a result of such 
an intentional physical invasion, regardless of bodily harm. 
In addition, the plaintiff’s harm is presumed in such cases.125 The 
plaintiff need not establish any harm. The invasion alone is sufficient to 
support a claim; these “trespassory” torts are regarded as “harmful in 
themselves.”126 
For example, battery, one of the oldest torts, provides legal redress 
for “the least touching of another” according to Blackstone.127 Every 
man’s person is sacred, and no other has a right to meddle with it.128 To 
make a case for battery, the plaintiff must merely show that the 
 121.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. (a) (AM. L. INST. 1934) (“A contact which 
causes no bodily harm may be actionable as a violation of the right to freedom from the intentional 
infliction of offensive bodily contacts.”); DOBBS, supra note 66, § 47 (“When the trespassory tort 
causes no physical harm, the traditional tort rule is that the plaintiff can nevertheless recover 
substantial as distinct from nominal damages. The idea is loosely linked to the idea of mental distress, 
but no actual proof of mental distress is required. The invasion of the plaintiff’s rights is regarded as 
a harm in itself and subject to an award of damages. If the plaintiff suffers emotional distress as a 
result of any of these torts, even without physical harm, she is entitled to recover for that emotional 
distress as a separate element of damages.”).  
 122.  E.g., Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1075–76 
(2008) (“Dignitary harm is presumed to flow from interference with bodily autonomy, because the 
right to bodily autonomy is considered integral to self determination and therefore is fiercely 
protected.”). 
 123.  The tort of negligence also provides redress for physical invasion, but a plaintiff in a 
negligence case must prove harm in order to recover. Once a plaintiff has proven bodily harm resulting 
from a negligent physical invasion, though, he can recover for any other harms flowing therefrom, 
including emotional harm. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 120 (contrasting negligence with the trespassory 
torts: “[n]o matter how offended or distressed the plaintiff might be when the defendant drives at 100 
mph in a school zone, the defendant is not liable for negligence if he causes no harm. What counts as 
actual harm may be debated . . . but the underlying rule that harm is required has not been doubted.”). 
 124.  See id. § 48 (“When the defendant causes emotional distress by inflicting an unconsented-
to and unjustified touching, or by inflicting any trespassory tort, the plaintiff can claim emotional 
distress damages resulting from that tort, without proving the elements of tort called intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”). 
 125.  Id. § 28 (“All of these torts are actionable even if the plaintiff has no proven physical harm. 
Perhaps courts assume that the plaintiff suing for a trespassory tort has some kind of emotional harm, 
but if so, the plaintiff is not required to prove it.”). 
126.  See id. § 47 (“The invasion of the plaintiff’s rights is regarded as a harm in itself . . . .”). 
 127.  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, Book 3, Ch. 8 (1765–
1769) (stating that the tort of battery “prohibits the first and lowest stage of it.”). 
128.  Id. 
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defendant’s intentional act resulted in an offensive touching of the 
plaintiff’s person or something so closely associated with the plaintiff as 
to make the touching tantamount to a physical invasion of the plaintiff’s 
person.129 “[T]he essence of the plaintiff’s grievance consists in the 
offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion 
of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical harm done to his 
body. . . .”130 For that reason, it is not even necessary that the plaintiff’s 
actual body be disturbed.131 It is the physical invasion that is important, 
not whether the plaintiff suffered bodily versus emotional harm.132 
The tort of assault likewise involves an invasion of a physical interest 
and allows recovery for emotional harm regardless of bodily harm.133 But 
the emotional harm suffered by an assault victim is not the type of 
“emotional harm” the law has been skeptical of or reluctant to address.134 
The tort has been recognized at least since 1348 in I. de S. and Wife v. W. 
De S., in which the court ruled that emotional harm alone, even without 
any accompanying bodily harm, is itself an injury for which the law, 
through the tort of assault, will grant recovery to a plaintiff.135 Similarly, 
the tort of false imprisonment protects against invasions in physical 
autonomy and for emotional harm regardless of bodily harm.136 
The important point here is that a plaintiff asserting a claim for 
battery, assault, or false imprisonment has asserted invasion of a physical 
interest—a physical injury to the person.137 And those plaintiffs have 
never been required to allege or prove bodily harm. They certainly have 
not been required to prove any observable bodily harm. As long as the 
129.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM LAW INST., 1965). 
130.  Id. 
131.  See id. 
132.  Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 938–39 (2010). 
133.  DOBBS, supra note 66, § 382 (“The tort of assault . . . involves nothing more than a threat 
of immediate use of force that puts the plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of an unconsented-to 
bodily touching. By definition, no physical harm is required. The recovery for assault is a recovery 
for that unpleasant apprehension, a species of emotional distress.”). 
 134.  E.g., Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 793–99 (Ind. 2008) (affirming jury award of 
$325,000 for assault, even where jury rejected plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim; plaintiff presented evidence that his major depressive disorder, anxiety and panic disorder was 
caused by defendant’s assault). 
135.  I de S et ux. v. W de S, Y.B.Lib.Ass. folio 99, placitum 60 (Assizes 1348). 
136.  DOBBS, supra note 66, § 382. 
137.  Trespass to land also protects against a physical invasion of a different sort—an invasion 
of the plaintiff’s interest in exclusive possession of the land. This Article does not attempt to suggest 
that emotional harms arising from claims to trespass to land (or any other trespass to property tort) 
should be excluded.  
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tortious conduct is intentional,138 it matters not whether the injury causes 
bodily harm because the interest protected is against a physical invasion, 
the most fiercely protected interest. 
D. The personal physical injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should, as 
tort law does, treat all emotional harm flowing from personal 
injuries the same, regardless of whether bodily harm also results 
from the personal injury. 
The “personal physical injury” exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should be 
interpreted consistently with the ancient understanding that tort law 
protects against intentional139 physical injuries to the person regardless of 
bodily harm. In its treatment of emotional harm, the personal physical 
injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should, as tort law, consider the type of 
injury that is the source of emotional harm. In addition, it should, as tort 
law does, treat all emotional harm flowing from personal injuries the 
same, regardless of whether bodily harm also results from the personal 
injury. Although damages awarded to compensate for emotional harm 
flowing from emotional or economic injuries are not excluded from 
taxable income under § 104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from all 
physical injuries should be excluded under § 104(a)(2). In other words, 
the “physical” qualifier of § 104(a)(2) should be interpreted to draw a line 
between the first category of injuries—physical injuries—and the second 
and third categories of injuries. With the 1996 “physical” qualifier and the 
declaration that emotional distress is not physical injury, Congress did not 
intend to tax emotional harms arising from tort physical injuries, such as 
a sexual assault, but instead intended to target emotional harms arising 
from emotional, intangible, and economic injuries, such as in cases of 
defamation and employment discrimination. 
 138.  Within the first category of injuries, the Restatement Second does treat the interest in 
freedom from harmful bodily contacts (harmful contact battery) somewhat more favorably in that that 
interest is protected against both negligent and intentional invasions, whereas the others are protected 
only against intentional invasions. So long as the tortious conduct is intentional, though, the plaintiff 
has a claim whether or not the contact causes bodily harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
15 (AM LAW INST., 1965). 
 139.  The first category of protected interests are also addressed by the tort of negligence. A 
claim for negligent physical invasion is distinguishable from a claim asserting an intentional invasion 
in that the negligence claim will require proof of actual harm, whereas the intentional tort claim will 
not. This Article does not make any argument that, where the harm is other than bodily, emotional 
harms should be excluded. Where the negligently inflicted harm is bodily, even the current prevailing 
interpretation of § 104(a)(2) will allow exclusion of damages awarded for emotional harms arising 
from the bodily harm. Thus, in sum, this Article will not any further address damages for emotional 
harms resulting from negligence claims.  
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That interpretation would eliminate the need to distinguish even 
further between bodily harms that are observable and those that are not. It 
would avoid the rather absurd result of the Bruise Ruling140 that required 
the victim of offensive battery, likely assault, and likely common law 
harmful battery to prove her harm with a bruise. It would give the same 
tax treatment to the emotional distress damages awarded to Law Clerk 2 
and Law Clerk 3—both of whom were sexually assaulted by their boss. 
And, as explained in the following Part, it would still tax damages for 
emotional harm that Congress actually sought to tax with the 1996 
amendment. 
E. Semantics 
Interpreting “personal physical injury” and “emotional distress” 
under § 104(a)(2) as referring to tort injuries, as distinguished from tort 
harms, reconciles what otherwise seems to be a flawed syllogism in the 
statute and its legislative history. 
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from income “damages received on 
account of personal physical injuries.” 141 It then states that “emotional 
distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness.”142 
Focusing on that statutory language alone, it would logically follow that 
damages received on account of emotional distress are not excluded. 
But, despite that logical syllogism, emotional distress damages often 
are excluded, according to both legislative history and the regulations.143 
They are excluded if awarded “on account of a physical injury,”144 
although they are not considered a physical injury. How can it be that 
emotional distress is not a physical injury but at the same time can be 
attributable to a physical injury. This seems illogical. 
It does make sense, though, if one considers the differing concepts 
of a tort injury and a tort harm and applies the concept of emotional injury 
to the code language and the concept of emotional harm to the legislative 
history and regulations. Assume that the term “emotional distress” in the 
140.  See supra Part III(C). 
141.  I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018). 
142.  Id. 
143.  H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (“Because all damages received on account of 
physical injury or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross 
income applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is attributable to 
a physical injury or physical sickness.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (“Emotional 
distress is not considered a physical injury or physical sickness. However, damages for emotional 
distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from income under section 
104(a)(2).”). 
144.  Id. 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss1/3
2019] TAX FREE DAMAGES 101 
§ 104(a)(2) language “emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical
injury” refers to emotional injury, not emotional harm. Assume that the 
history and regulation reference to “emotional distress” refers to 
emotional harm, not emotional injury. 
Logically this makes sense: Damages received on account of 
personal physical injuries (tort personal physical injuries) are excluded, 
per § 104(a)(2). And, per the legislative history and the regulation, that 
exclusion for personal physical injuries includes emotional harms (which 
they label “emotional distress”) attributable to those personal physical 
injuries. But, pursuant to the language of § 104(a)(2), damages received 
on account of emotional injuries (which they also label “emotional 
distress”) are not. 
V. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENT INDICATES THAT 
ITS PURPOSE WAS TO REMOVE FROM THE EXCLUSION DAMAGES 
AWARDED TO COMPENSATE FOR INTANGIBLE, EMOTIONAL, AND 
PECUNIARY INJURIES, NOT THE “PHYSICAL INJURIES” EXPLAINED 
ABOVE. 
The legislative history of the 1996 amendment supports this Article’s 
suggestion that § 104(a)(2)’s “personal physical injury” can be interpreted 
as the tort concept of physical injury to the person, and thus, damages 
awarded to compensate for emotional harms flowing therefrom are 
excluded from taxable income, regardless of any preceding bodily harm, 
such as in a case of sexual assault that leaves less than a bruise. The 
legislative history indicates that, in narrowing “personal injury” to 
“personal physical injury,” the purpose was to remove from the exclusion 
damages awarded to compensate for intangible and pecuniary injuries, 
including emotional harm flowing therefrom and physical manifestations 
of that emotional harm. The legislative history provides no indication that 
there was a desire to tax emotional distress damages arising from physical 
injuries (as this Article uses that term), such as a sexual assault that leaves 
less than a bruise. 
First, it is important to note that Congress did not set out to tax all 
emotional distress damages. Damages received for emotional distress are 
sometimes excluded under § 104(a)(2). The exclusion does apply to 
damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is 
“attributable to” a physical injury or physical sickness.145 Furthermore, a 
 145.  The legislative history of the Act (the House Report), states: “Because all damages received 
on account of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion 
from gross income applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is 
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plaintiff can sometimes exclude emotional distress damages from income 
even if the plaintiff is not the person who suffered the physical injury to 
which the emotional distress can be attributed.146 Damages for emotional 
distress arising from loss of consortium and wrongful death are excluded 
because they originated in a physical injury. 147 In addition, damages that 
reimburse for medical expenses related to emotional distress are 
excluded.148 The target of the amendment, then, was not emotional 
distress damages. 
Instead, the goal of the amendment was to tax damages that are 
intended to compensate for lost wages but that are dressed up as damages 
for physical injuries in an attempt to be tax free “personal physical 
injuries.” The modification was largely in response to plaintiffs in 
employment lawsuits who would seek to allocate most of their damages 
to emotional distress, which was then arguably excluded as a 104(a)(2) 
“personal injury,” even though a significant portion of their claim was for 
lost wages.149 The Committee Report states: 
Courts have interpreted the exclusion from gross income of damages 
received on account of personal injury or sickness broadly in some cases 
to cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to a physical injury 
or sickness. For example, some courts have held that the exclusion 
applies to damages in cases involving certain forms of employment 
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01 (1996), as 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–93. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 
2012) (“Emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or physical sickness. However, 
damages for emotional distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from 
income under section 104(a)(2).”). 
146.  H.R. Rep. No. 104-737 reads: 
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages (other 
than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are treated as payments received on account 
of physical injury or physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the 
injured party. For example, damages other than punitive damages) received by an individ-
ual on account of a claim for loss of consortium due to the physical injury or physical 
sickness of such individual’s spouse are excluded from gross income. In addition, damages 
(other than punitive damages) received on account of a claim of wrongful death continue 
to be excluded from taxable income as under present law. H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, 301 
(1996). 
147.  Id. 
 148.  I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018) (“The precedent sentence [which declares that emotional distress 
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness] shall not apply to am amount of damages 
not in excess of the amount paid for medical care . . . attributable to emotional distress.”). 
149.  Wood, supra note 26, at 283. 
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discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury 
or sickness.150 
In the section of the Committee Report entitled “Reasons for Change,” the 
report offers that damages received on a claim not involving physical 
injury or physical sickness “are generally to compensate the claimant for 
lost profits or lost wages that would otherwise be included in taxable 
income.”151 Those claims were the target of the amendment. Why, then, 
specifically address emotional distress? 
In order to accomplish the goal of removing from the exclusion 
damages that are “generally” intended to compensate for lost wages, but 
which crafty plaintiffs might characterize as “physical injuries,” it was 
necessary to specifically address emotional distress. Congress may have 
been concerned that, if the exclusion continued to apply to emotional 
distress, —that is, if emotional distress itself was considered a “physical 
injury,” — employment discrimination plaintiffs (and the like) would 
attempt to characterize most or all of their damages as being for emotional 
distress, and therefore tax exempt, rather than for taxable income 
replacement.152 Thus, Congress specified that “physical injury” does not 
include emotional distress and further stated that the term emotional 
distress includes physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches, stomach 
disorders) which may result from such emotional distress.153 
Neither the code nor the legislative history defines “physical injury.” 
But the Committee distinguished between, on the one hand, awards that 
150.  H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–
93. 
 151.  Id. (emphasis added). The Report also referenced two then-recently decided Supreme Court 
cases as examples of types of claims targeted: Comm’r v. Schleier, and United States v. Burke. The 
issue in Schleier was whether the taxpayer could exclude from taxable income backpay and liquidated 
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 
323, 324–25 (1995). The issue in Burke was whether the plaintiffs could exclude damages awarded 
in a Title VII action alleged that their employer had discriminated against them on the basis of sex in 
determining salaries. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 230 (1992).  
 152.  See Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 184–85 (“One can only surmise that Congress 
recognized that if emotional distress constituted a physical injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2), the 
congressional purpose of negating an exclusion for damages on account of dignitary torts like 
employment discrimination would be largely thwarted. For example, in virtually every case of 
employment discrimination, a victim could be expected to argue that she suffered emotional distress 
as a result of the employer’s actions and was suing the employer to recover for that injury. But for the 
amendment language denying physical injury or physical sickness status to emotional distress, the 
taxpayer’s action would come within the exclusionary rule of amended § 104(a)(2).”). 
 153.  Wood, supra note 26, at 283 (asserting that the 1996 modification was in response to what 
Congress and the IRS viewed as abuses by plaintiffs in employment lawsuits who would seek to 
allocate most of their recoveries to emotional distress even though a significant portion of their claim 
was for lost wages). 
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do relate to a physical injury or sickness and, on the other hand, awards 
that involve employment discrimination and injury to reputation. For the 
former, damages for emotional distress are excluded under § 104(a)(2). 
For the latter, however, damages for emotional distress are taxed because 
they, generally, are intended to compensate for lost wages. 
A claim for assault, offensive battery, or false imprisonment is not 
generally intended to compensate for lost wages or income like a claim 
for employment discrimination or injury to reputation. Thus, those claims 
are not the target of the 1996 amendment. There is nothing in the code or 
the legislative history to so indicate. 
The House Report further states that “the taxation of damages 
received in cases not involving a physical injury or physical sickness 
should not depend on the type of claim made.”154 Thus, if a case does not 
redress a personal physical injury, there need not be any further inquiry 
into the type of claim in order to determine whether the damages are 
excluded under § 104(a)(2). They are taxable. If a case does redress a 
personal physical injury, though, there is likewise no need to further 
inquire into the type of claim. The damages awarded to compensate for 
any harms suffered as a result should be excluded from taxable income 
under § 104(a)(2). 
VI. IRS NOD TO THE CONCEPT THAT SOME TORTS ARE INHERENTLY
PHYSICAL 
In a 2007 Memorandum, the IRS was willing to assume § 104(a)(2) 
“personal physical injuries” in a sex abuse case without evidence proving 
that there were ever any observable bruises, cuts, or the like.155 When the 
man was a minor in the care of Entity A, Entity A’s employee caused 
“physical injury” to the him through a tort.156 Entity A made payments to 
the man to settle the tort claims.157 Although many years had passed, the 
man “continue[d] to struggle with the trauma resulting from” the tort.158 
Because of the passage of time and because he was a minor at the time the 
tort occurred, the man would “have difficult establishing the extent of the 
physical injuries.”159 
154.  H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01 (1996). 
 155.  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 200809001 at *2 (Nov. 27, 2007). It may be worth nothing that 
the author, Michael J. Montemurro, also authored the Bruise Ruling. 
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Id. 
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The IRS was willing to presume that man had been compensated for 
personal physical injuries and held that all damages for emotional distress 
were attributable to those personal physical injuries and thus excludable 
under § 104(a)(2). “Under these circumstances, it is reasonable for the 
Service to presume that the settlement compensated [the man] for personal 
physical injuries, and that all damages for emotional distress were 
attributable to the physical injuries.”160 
What circumstances made the presumptions necessary to conclude 
that all of these damages were for emotional distress that is excludable 
under § 104(a)(2) as attributable to physical injuries? His minority? The 
passage of time? Both? Because it was, under those facts, “difficult to 
establish the extent of the physical injuries?” The memorandum does not 
say. 
It was reasonable to make that presumption in that case of sex abuse, 
as in any other, because such a plaintiff has suffered an invasion of the 
plaintiff’s interest in primary autonomy, physical security, and physical 
liberty—a “physical injury” as tort law understands that concept. It is also 
reasonable to make that presumption in any case in which the plaintiff 
proves all elements of battery, offensive or harmful; false 
imprisonment;161 or assault because, by definition, that plaintiff has 
suffered a physical injury in that the defendant has invaded the plaintiff’s 
interest in primary autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty. 
These torts are, by their very nature, physical. It is difficult to deny that 
this is true in cases of battery, whether or not it leaves a bruise. It seems 
disingenuous to argue that an inappropriate, unwanted, sexual contact is 
not “physical” simply because it does not leave a bruise.162 
VII.CONCLUSION
The personal physical injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should, as tort 
law does, consider the type of injury that is the source of emotional harm 
and, more specifically, treat all emotional harm flowing from personal 
injuries the same, regardless of whether bodily harm also results from the 
personal injury. Although damages awarded to compensate for emotional 
harm flowing from emotional or economic injuries are not excluded from 
160.  Id. 
 161.  Wood, supra note 26, at 285 (“If one is deprived of one’s personal liberty, if one is confined 
unlawfully behind bars, is that not by its very nature physical? . . . [W]ouldn’t being confined in a jail 
cell (unlawfully) always be physical?”). 
162.  Id. (“Some things are inherently and incontrovertibly physical, whether or not they leave 
lasting outward scars. Sex abuse surely fits this category, as does rape or other sexual assault.”). 
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taxable income under § 104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from all 
physical injuries should be excluded under § 104(a)(2). 
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